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THE CASE FOR FIXED-BOUNDARY CONSTITUENCIES IN IRELAND 
John Coakley 
Abstract 
The process of constituency boundary revision in Ireland, designed to satisfy what is per-
ceived as a rigid requirement that a uniform deputy-population ratio be maintained across 
constituencies, has traditionally consumed a great deal of the time of politicians and offi-
cials. For almost two decades after a High Court ruling in 1961 (in the O’Donovan case), 
the process was a political one, was highly contentious, and was marked by serious alle-
gations of ministerial gerrymandering. The introduction in 1979 of constituency commis-
sions made up of officials neutralised, for the most part, charges that the system had be-
come too politicised, but it continued the process of micro-management of constituency 
boundaries that had been introduced in 1935. This paper suggests that the continuing 
problems caused by this system—notably, the permanently changing nature of constitu-
ency boundaries and resulting difficulties of geographical identification—could be re-
solved by reversion to the procedure that is normal in proportional representation sys-
tems: periodic post-census allocation of seats to constituencies whose boundaries are 
based on those of recognised local government units and which are stable over time. This 
reform, replacing the principle of redistricting by the principle of reapportionment, would 
result in more recognisable constituencies, more predictable boundary trajectories over 
time, and a more efficient, fairer and speedier process of revision. 
Introduction 
The ideal of fair, impartially drawn constituency boundaries is a crucial concern in election 
administration; it has been identified as one of 11 dimensions that are central to the concept 
of electoral integrity (Norris et al., 2013: 127). Although allegations of gerrymander are now 
rarely to be heard, it was not always so. Accusations of political bias in the process of con-
stituency boundary revision peaked in the 1960s and the 1970s and, even though they have 
receded, critics have found other reasons for criticising the process. In this, Ireland is unusu-
al in the world of proportional representation electoral systems. Debates of the kind that take 
place each time a new blueprint for Dáil constituency boundaries is drawn up are not un-
known in continental Europe (for example, the controversy that began in 2003 over the parti-
tion of the Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde parliamentary constituency in Belgium), but they tend to 
occur for rather unique reasons rather than being inbuilt, predictable components in the revi-
sion process, and they have not been associated with anything like the divisiveness of the 
corresponding debates in Ireland. 
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The present article addresses this particular issue in election administration in the Irish con-
text; it draws attention to the negative consequences of frequent, unpredictable changes in 
constituency boundaries, changes whose effects have been well documented (Kavanagh, 
2003: 93-98). Consequences include an additional element of insecurity and uncertainty over 
the future on the part of Dáil deputies; confusion and potential alienation over unfamiliar 
boundaries on the part of voters; and a heavy, unnecessary and potentially contentious ad-
ministrative burden on the part of officials. This article argues that the Irish approach to con-
stituency boundary delimitation is eccentric and inappropriate, and that it could be avoided by 
adoption of a simple formula that is close to being universal in proportional representation 
systems: definition by legislation of ‘permanent’ constituency boundaries, which might, how-
ever, be subject to minor changes in the long term in response to major population move-
ment patterns or administrative reforms, with seats re-allocated between constituencies by 
an official by means of a simple mathematical formula after each population census. 
The article begins by setting the Irish experience in comparative context. It continues by de-
scribing the kind of system that might be adopted with a view to bringing Irish provisions in 
line with the norm elsewhere in proportional representation systems. It concludes with a dis-
cussion of the key issues to which the adoption of such a system in Ireland would give rise.1 
Ireland in Comparative Perspective 
Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to achieving what is regarded as one of the cor-
nerstones of modern representative democracy, the notion of equal suffrage—the principle 
that, where there are territorial constituencies for the election of parliamentarians, the ratio of 
parliamentary representatives to population should be more or less the same across constit-
uencies. First, especially where there are single-member constituencies, territorial bounda-
ries can be adjusted to match a standard deputy-population ratio (the principle of redistrict-
ing). Second, especially where there are multi-member constituencies, the allocation of par-
liamentary seats to constituencies (typically, administrative districts such as counties or prov-
inces) can be adjusted after each population census to match the standard deputy-
population ratio (the principle of reapportionment). Sometimes, both approaches may have a 
role—in the USA, for example, where the reapportionment principle is used to reallocate 
seats to states after each census and redistricting is used to distribute these seats within 
states, or Germany, where one set of seats is redistributed periodically between provinces 
(Länder), while another set is filled from single-member constituencies whose boundaries are 
revised as necessary (Watson, 2006; Schrott, 2006). 
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The redistricting principle is, then, to be seen in operation mainly in countries that use the 
plurality system (such as the UK and Canada) or other systems that are normally based on 
single-member districts (such as France, with the two-ballot system). It is in varying degrees 
associated with controversy about the boundary delimitation processs, with the most bitter 
disputes taking place in the USA, where allegations of gerrymander are widespread 
(McDonald, 2008; Brunell and Grofman, 2008). 
The reapportionment principle is to be seen at work in countries that use the party list sys-
tem. Where there is a single-tier system, the design of constituencies and the allocation of 
seats between them is a simple, automatic process. The basic administrative units become 
constituencies: in Switzerland, the cantons; in Spain, the provinces; in Belgium, the provinc-
es, except for Brabant (which has been partitioned in response to problems of linguistic poli-
tics); in Luxembourg, four groups of cantons; in Portugal, administrative districts; and in Fin-
land groups of municipalities, which correspond substantially to provinces. Seats are allocat-
ed between these strictly on the basis of population as measured by the most recent census 
(though occasionally citizen population or electorate may be used). Variants on this system 
are to be found elsewhere. Sometimes the allocation takes place on a two-tier basis: most 
seats are allocated to constituencies, but some are held over to a higher level and are allo-
cated on the same mathematical basis (as in Greece, Austria, Sweden, Norway and Den-
mark, though in the last two of these cases the allocation formula is not based exclusively on 
population). 
The actual mathematical formula used for seat reapportionment is in principle straightfor-
ward: a quota (for example, the Droop quota, where the population is divided by one more 
than the total number of parliamentary seats) is used as a divisor in respect of the popula-
tions of the various districts. Since, however, the division process will almost never result in 
integer numbers of members being allocated, a decision needs to be made on how to deal 
with the fractional portion (for example, if a constituency is entitled to 4.5 seats, should it get 
four seats or five?). All conventional apportionment formulas will allocate the integer portion 
calculated in this way to the respective constituencies. In practice, three types of formula are 
used to deal with fractional remainders. 
• The largest remainder system: remaining seats are allocated to the constituencies with 
the largest remaining fractions in descending order until all seats have been distributed. 
This was used over the period 1852-1901 in apportioning seats in the House of Repre-
sentatives between the states in the USA, where it has been labelled the Hamilton method 
(Alexander Hamilton had sought unsuccessfully to secure its introduction in the 1790s). 
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• The D’Hondt highest average system: remaining seats are allocated to the constituencies 
with the highest average seat-population ratios in descending order, where the average is 
based on the principle of adjusting the quota such that the final set of numbers for each 
constituency will, when truncated, total exactly the number of seats in parliament. This has 
been labelled the Jefferson method; it was adopted in the USA in 1791 in preference to 
the Hamilton method for allocation of House of Representative seats at federal level, and 
continued in use until 1842. 
• The Sainte-Laguë highest average system: remaining seats are allocated to the constitu-
encies with the highest average seat-population ratios in descending order, where the av-
erage is based on the principle of adjusting the quota such that the final set of numbers for 
each constituency will, when rounded, total exactly the number of seats in parliament. 
This has been labelled the Webster method in the USA after the lawyer-politician Daniel 
Webster; it was used in US apportionment at federal level for the periods 1842-52 and 
1901-41. 
These three methods have different properties (for example, the largest remainder system is 
open to manipulation in partisan contexts, and the D’Hondt system is biased in the direction 
of larger groups), and they may be computed following procedures different from those re-
ported here (for example, allocation under the D’Hondt and Sainte-Laguë systems is typically 
carried out using a division table, as the order in which seats are allocated to groups—and 
not just the overall total—may matter). But these are ultimately mathematically identical to 
the procedures described above. They may, however, produce different outcomes in respect 
of the numbers of seats finally allocated to groups. Specialist study suggests that the Sainte-
Laguë (Webster) system—and not its more complex successor in the USA—is the fairest 
system all round (Balinksi and Young, 2001: 71-78). In continental Europe, though, the larg-
est remainder system is commonly used in allocation of seats to constituencies, though 
some countries (such as Portugal) use the D’Hondt system. 
The broad constitutional parameters of the Irish approach to the question of redistricting and 
reapportionment have remained unchanged since the creation of the state. Article 26 of the 
1922 constitution specified the minimum and maximum size of the Dáil (not less than one 
member for each 30,000 of the population, nor more than one member for each 20,000 of 
the population), stipulated that the ratio of population to Dáil deputies at the most recent cen-
sus should ‘so far as possible, be identical throughout the country’, and required the Oireach-
tas to revise the constituencies ‘at least once every ten years, with due regard to changes in 
distribution of the population’. These provisions were carried over in the 1937 constitution, 
except that the revision period was extended from 10 to 12 years, a minimum number of 
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members per constituency was specified (three), and the requirement of an equal deputy-
population ratio ‘so far as possible’ was mis-rendered in the English version as ‘so far as it is 
practicable’, as discussed later. 
These constitutional provisions formed the basis for a process of major legislation, the Elec-
toral Act, 1923, which defined the boundaries of the constituencies to be used in the new 
state. It created a set of 28 territorial constituencies, ranging in size from three to nine mem-
bers, using the county as the basic unit. The only exceptions were three double-county con-
stituencies (Laois-Offaly, Carlow-Kilkenny and Longford-Westmeath), and three counties di-
vided by grouping local electoral areas (Dublin city and Mayo county divided in two, and Cork 
county divided in three). The overall distribution of seats under this and subsequent electoral 
acts is described in table 1. 
[table 1 about here] 
The requirement for revision at least once every 10 years was immediately breached by late 
enactment of the Electoral (Revision of Constituencies) Act, 1935. Moving away from the 
principles of the 1923 act, this reduced average constituency size, leaving only three with 
more than five members. It also largely disregarded county boundaries: 27 of the 34 constit-
uencies were now based on small or micro-units such as district electoral divisions or, in 
Dublin, on complex imaginary lines running between named points. For example, the new 
constituency of Clare included part of Galway, Leitrim included part of Sligo, and Waterford 
included part of Cork; Carlow-Kildare excluded a small part of Carlow, which was merged 
instead with Wicklow; and Meath-Westmeath excluded a sizeable portion of the latter county, 
which was included (together with part of Roscommon) in the new constituency of Athlone-
Longford. The act was perceived in partisan terms, with allegations that its promoter, Minister 
for Local Government Sean T. O’Kelly, was engaging in an exercise in gerrymander (Dáil 
Debates, 21 Mar. 1934, vol. 51, cols 1271-1303). The next act, the Electoral (Amendment) 
Act, 1947, largely restored county boundaries, though further reducing constituency size 
(none now had more than five members), and the same pattern was followed in the 1959 act. 
The 1959 act, however, turned out to have a fatal flaw. The Minister for Local Government, 
Neil Blaney, explicitly moved away from the criterion of population, arguing that area also 
needed to be considered, since ‘it should be made as convenient as possible for a Deputy to 
keep in touch with his constituents’ (Dáil Debates, 28 Oct. 1959, vol. 177, col. 379). Once 
again, the opposition smelled a rat, since the sparsely populated areas that would gain from 
this consideration also happened to be areas of Fianna Fáil strength. The constitutionality of 
the act was challenged by opposition senator John O’Donovan, and it was struck down in the 
High Court on the grounds that, in the words of Justice Budd, ‘it has been clearly established 
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that the form of the Act of 1959 has been such as to result in substantial departures from the 
stipulated ratio of members to population, causing grave inequalities of parliamentary repre-
sentation, and that it has likewise been demonstrated that there are no relevant circumstanc-
es to justify these departures’.2 
Although this judgement was widely seen as delivering a blow against politically motivated 
constituency boundary revision, its effect in practice was quite the opposite. By requiring very 
close adherence to a uniform deputy-population ratio, the judgement was open to the inter-
pretation that it permitted (or even required) micromanagement of constituency boundaries, 
thus offering cover for manipulation of boundaries to optimise the chances of government 
victory. Precisely such allegations were made in respect of the next three revisions, which 
were enacted respectively in 1961, 1969 and 1974 (the last of these, piloted through by Local 
Government Minister James Tully on behalf of the Fine Gael-Labour coalition, was the only 
such measure not drafted by Fianna Fáil). The degree of controversy attracted by the acts 
may be assessed by reference to the duration of the parliamentary debates on them. Debate 
on the 1961 act took up almost 500 columns in the official report of the Dáil and Seanad de-
bates (about 24 hours or parliamentary time); the 1969 act took up more than 1,000 columns 
(about 50 hours of parliamentary time); and the 1974 act took up over 1,600 columns (the 
equivalent of a big, 800-page volume, or about 80 hours of parliamentary time). 
The 1974 act was interpreted by its opponents, and indeed by some of its supporters, as a 
spectacular ‘own goal’: because of unexpected changes in patterns of electoral support, a 
system allegedly designed to secure victory for the Fine Gael-Labour coalition instead gave 
an advantage to Fianna Fáil, which was swept to victory in 1977. The new Fianna Fáil gov-
ernment reacted by committing itself to depoliticising the process, and duly made provision 
for a series of ad-hoc constituency boundary commissions—initially to advise on constituen-
cy boundaries for the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, and then a set 
of five once-off commissions (chaired by a judge and with the Clerk of the Dáil and the Sec-
retary of the Department of the Environment as its other members) to determine Dáil constit-
uency boundaries (see Ireland, 1980; 1983; 1988; 1990; 1995). All except that of 1988 
(which fell foul of allegations that its terms of reference were biased against smaller parties) 
were enacted into law without modification. 
Finally, the boundary revision process was placed on a statutory basis by the Electoral Act, 
1997, which provided for a five-person commission (a senior judge nominated by the Chief 
Justice, the Ombudsman, the Secretary General of the Department of the Environment, and 
the Clerks of the Dáil and Seanad). In addition to the constitutional requirement to observe 
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‘as far as it is practicable’ a uniform deputy-population ratio from constituency to constituen-
cy, the commission is bound by the following terms of reference: 
(a) the total number of members of the Dáil, subject to Article 16.2.2 of the Constitution, 
shall be not less than 164 and not more than 168 [amended in 2011 to specify 153 and 
160 as the limits]; 
(b) each constituency shall return three, four or five members; 
(c) the breaching of county boundaries shall be avoided as far as practicable; 
(d) each constituency shall be composed of contiguous areas; 
(e) there shall be regard to geographic considerations including significant physical features 
and the extent of and the density of population in each constituency; and 
(f) subject to the provisions of this section, the Commission shall endeavour to maintain 
continuity in relation to the arrangement of constituencies (Electoral Act, 1997, art. 6.2). 
The provisions of the act have been triggered on four occasions in respect of Dáil elections 
(see Ireland, 1997; 2003; 2007; 2011), leading to boundary revision acts in 1998, 2005, 2009 
and 2013, respectively. This new mechanism undoubtedly promoted wider acceptance of a 
process that had been tainted by allegations of gerrymandering and of pursuit of naked elec-
toral self-interest; related to this, they have saved a great deal of parliamentary time. By con-
trast with the 80 hours of parliamentary time taken up by the 1974 act, subsequent acts got 
through the parliamentary process relatively quickly, typically taking about five hours (though, 
for particular reasons, the 2005 act took a much longer time, while that of 2013 took only a 
few minutes). 
[table 2 about here] 
The geographical robustness and stability of constituency boundaries may be assessed in 
respect of three criteria, as illustrated in table 2. The first is the extent to which they coincide 
with existing, widely recognised administrative units. As the table shows, though, constituen-
cy boundaries do not usually coincide with county boundaries, and where they depart from 
these they typically use low- or micro-level units for purposes of definition, except in 1923, 
when local electoral areas were used. The problem here is that because of Ireland’s unusual-
ly weak system of local government, sub-county units have for long been used mainly for 
purposes of statistical reporting. Following the abolition of rural district councils and the con-
sequent sidelining of electoral divisions in 1925, Ireland had a one-and-a-half tier system of 
local government; this was replaced in 2014 by an unusually centralised single-tier system 
based on counties. For this reason, sub-county units do not correspond to patterns of local 
identity, which continue to focus on such entities as towns and, in rural areas, Catholic par-
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ishes; and there is no reason to doubt the judgement, several decades ago, that the county 
continues to be ‘powerfully supported by local sentiment and tradition’ (Ireland, 1972: 25).3 
The second, related, criterion is the ease with which constituencies may be described, as 
measured by the number of words used to define them in the schedules to the electoral acts. 
In 1923, the description was succinct (386 words), in line with the norm in other countries. In 
all other case, however, it took something in the region of two to three thousand words to de-
fine the new boundaries, and the resulting descriptions relied on unfamiliar areas (electoral 
divisions) last used for administrative purposes in the local elections of 1914. These units do 
not coincide at all with polling districts, and the rural districts in which they are grouped dis-
appeared as administrative units in 1925. The example of Galway West as defined in the 
2013 act illustrates the byzantine character of such descriptions. Although many of the place 
names would be recognised locally, and some even nationally, it is unlikely that anyone 
would be able to identify even the approximate borders of the electoral divisions to which 
they have given their names without access to official descriptions, which themselves are 
based on small townlands many of whose names and identities are now obsolete, except in 
property law): 
GALWAY WEST: The city of Galway;  
and, in the county of Galway, the electoral divisions of:  
Abhainn Ghabhla, An Cnoc Buí, An Uillinn, Ballynakill, Binn an Choire, Bunowen, Cleggan, Clif-
den, Cloch na Rón, Cushkillary, Derrycunlagh, Derrylea, Doonloughan, Errislannan, Inishbofin, 
Maíros, Rinvyle, Scainimh, Sillerna, in the former Rural District of Clifden; 
An Carn Mór, An Spidéal, Árainn, Aughrim, Baile Chláir, Baile an Teampaill, Ballynacourty, 
Bearna, Belleville, Ceathrú an Bhrúnaigh, Cill Aithnín, Clarinbridge, Deerpark, Eanach Dhúin, 
Galway Rural (part), Kilcummin, Leacach Beag, Liscananaun, Lisín an Bhealaigh, Maigh 
Cuilinn, Na Forbacha, Oranmore, Sailearna, Sliabh an Aonaigh, Stradbally, Tulaigh Mhic 
Aodháin, in the former Rural District of Galway;  
An Chorr, An Crompán, An Fhairche, An Ros, An Turlach, Camas, Cill Chuimín, Conga, Garm-
na, Leitir Breacáin, Leitir Móir, Letterfore, Oughterard, Wormhole, in the former Rural District of 
Oughterard;  
and, in the county of Mayo, the electoral divisions of:  
Ballinrobe, Cong, Dalgan, Houndswood, Kilcommon, Kilmaine, Neale, Shrule, in the former Ru-
ral District of Ballinrobe;  
Garrymore in the former Rural District of Claremorris (schedule to Electoral (Amendment) (Dáil 
Constituencies) Act, 2013). 
The third criterion used in table 2 is the stability of constituencies, as measured by their sur-
vival unchanged over time. It is possible to measure geographical stability by applying the 
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‘index of change’ developed by Anthony Fox (1983), and used extensively by Colin Rallings 
and Michael Thresher (see, for example, Rallings and Thrasher, 2007b) in respect of British 
constituency boundaries. This expresses total movement of the electorate (electors leaving 
the ‘base’ constituency plus those joining it) as a percentage of the total electorate of the 
‘base’ constituency, defined as the ‘old’ constituency contributing most electors to the corre-
sponding ‘new’ constituency. Unfortunately, Irish constituency commission reports do not 
provide sufficient data to readily compute this index (though it is possible to do so by recon-
structing the missing data). A similar index has been devised by Adrian Kavanagh (2014: 
227-9); this takes account of change in the number of deputies per constituency, as well as 
changes in population. 
Given data access difficulties and the primary concern here with boundary stability, table 2 
uses as simpler measure, the number of new and recently created constituencies. It rests on 
a rather demanding definition, counting as ‘new’ any constituency where there was even a 
marginal change in the boundary, or where the ‘new’ constituency had existed before an ear-
lier revision. The table shows that on each occasion an almost entirely new set of constituen-
cies was introduced—most had not existed previously (1983 was a striking exception, where 
changes were minor and were confined to Dublin). This measure correlates very closely with 
the Kavanagh index. The Fox index has also been computed for the 2013 revision. In that 
year, there was no change in respect of 11 constituencies (index = 0.0); in the remaining 29, 
it ranged from 1.4 (Waterford) to 96.7 (Dublin Bay North, based on Dublin North-Central), 
with a mean value of 22.6. Surprisingly, this is higher than the corresponding figure for Eng-
land in 2006 (20.6), rather lower than the figure for Scotland (45.8), but much higher than the 
figure for Wales (7.8) (Rallings et al, 2008: 81). Indeed, if the simple indicator use here is ap-
plied in the UK, it suggests that Irish constituencies have been considerably less stable than 
their UK counterparts.4 Looking at the stability of Irish constituencies over time, it may be 
noted that since the introduction of proportional representation in 1920, no fewer than 401 
new Dáil constituencies have been created; but many have been used just once, in a single 
election, before again being adjusted. The record for longevity is held by Laois-Offaly, which 
remained unaltered since it was created in 1920 as the constituency of King’s County-
Queen’s County until it was broken up in 2009. 
In addition to these relatively measurable features of the constituency revision process, there 
are less obvious social psychological costs. Especially in rural Ireland, where local loyalties—
especially county ones—are strong, significant offence may be caused by apparently arbi-
trary transfers of areas across county boundaries. The extract above shows the inclusion of a 
significant Mayo population in West Galway, an area with which few Mayo people would 
The case for fixed-boundary constituencies p. 10 
have empathy, with inter-county rivalry easily trumping any perception of shared interests. As 
a local newspaper put it, there was ‘growing resentment’ on the part of alienated Mayo vot-
ers, who ‘would eat you without salt’ (quoting a bruised Galway TD); as the newspaper saw 
it, ‘large scale breaches in county boundaries will result in isolation and alienation of the pub-
lic from national politics’ (Connacht Tribune, 15 March 2013). This is a recurring theme in the 
process of boundary revision in Ireland, with local communities complaining bitterly of the 
‘dismemberment’ of their counties (Coakley, 2007: 4-5). 
An Alternative System? 
The Irish experience of constituency boundary revision need not have been so negative. 
Other countries which moved to proportional representation in the late nineteenth or early 
twentieth centuries adopted a more straightforward approach to ensuring equality of repre-
sentation: they devised stable electoral districts, and then re-allocated parliamentary seats to 
these, typically following each population census. The Electoral Act of 1923 was quite com-
patible with this; but subsequent decisions to opt for constituency boundary revision rather 
than seat reallocation (a preference indeed hinted at in the constitution of 1922) took Ireland 
down a different path. Instead, the state opted for a UK-style approach to boundary revision, 
apparently overlooking the reality that, while this was a necessity in the UK, other mecha-
nisms to procure equality of representation exist in the case of multi-member electoral dis-
tricts. 
We may relatively easily illustrate what might have happened had Ireland indeed adopted the 
continental European system for ensuring that the distribution of parliamentary representa-
tion keeps pace with spatial patterns of population change. The first step would be to decide 
on an overall size for the Dáil. The constitutional stipulation that the number of deputies be 
not less than one for every 30,000 or more than one for every 20,000 of the population 
would, on the basis of the 1911 census results, imply a Dáil size ranging from 105 to 156. 
We assume here, arbitrarily, 140 Dáil deputies (in reality, the number fluctuated around this 
figure in the early years of the state). Dáil size could have remained at this level for several 
decades without breaching the constitutional limits, but for illustrative purposes it is assumed 
here that it would increase to 166 following the 1979 census, and that it would drop to 158 in 
2011 (as it did, following a decision that the overall size of the Dáil be reduced). 
Second, in defining constituency boundaries it makes sense to start with the country’s 31 
administrative counties as they existed at the beginning of the twentieth century (of the well-
known 26 counties, one, Tipperary, was divided into two entirely separate administrative 
units or ‘ridings’, and there were four county boroughs entirely separate from the counties 
The case for fixed-boundary constituencies p. 11 
with which they shared their names—Dublin, Cork, Limerick and Waterford). The 1911 cen-
sus data would tell us that simply allocating seats proportionately to counties would give us 
constituencies ranging from Carlow (with two seats) to Cork (with 14). The first of these is too 
small to facilitate proportional representation, and the second is so large that it risks confus-
ing voters (the number of candidates would be very large, reducing the prospects for in-
formed ranking of the kind which the single transferable vote system implies). Here, we set 
three as a minimum (a level in any case set by the constitution in 1937), and nine as a max-
imum, for practical reasons. With these limits in mind, we convert each administrative county 
into a Dáil constituency, with the following exceptions, to produce a standard set of 25 con-
stituencies: 
• The county boroughs (cities) of Limerick and Waterford are included in the counties with 
which they share their names; the two ridings of Tipperary together constitute a single 
constituency; and the small counties of Carlow, Laois, Longford, Leitrim and Monaghan 
are merged respectively with the counties of Kilkenny, Offaly, Westmeath, Sligo and Cav-
an to produce a set of five two-county constituencies 
• The county of Cork is divided into two constituencies, ‘East’ and ‘West’, by merging major 
local authority districts; Cork county borough (city) remains separate; and Dublin county 
borough (city) is divided into two constituencies, ‘North’ and ‘South’, on the same basis; 
Dublin county remains separate. 
Third, the Sainte-Laguë / Webster highest average allocation system is applied after each 
census to distribute Dáil seats to constituencies. 
The constituencies thus established would have been very stable. There would originally 
have been two large nine-seat constituencies (Cork West and Mayo), and five three-seat 
constituencies, with others returning intermediate numbers. Twenty constituencies could 
have continued with unaltered boundaries to the present. Five others would, though, have 
had to be revised. First, population decline would eventually cause Roscommon to fall below 
the threshold for three seats; here, it is merged with Leitrim-Sligo in 1971 to produce a new, 
larger constituency. The greater Dublin area would originally have been divided into three 
constituencies, but population growth and administrative reform there would have resulted in 
further divisions in 1930 (for administrative reasons), and in 1961, 1979 and 1986 (following 
the census). The number of Dublin constituencies would thus increase from three to eight 
(Coakley, 2013: 191). This pattern is illustrated in figure 1 at two points in time: on the foun-
dation of the state, and following the results of the most recent census in 2011 (for the popu-
lation of each of these notional constituencies at each census, the allocation of deputies to it, 
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the deputy-population ratio, and the deviation from the mean ratio, see Coakley, 2013: 212-
216). 
[figure 1 about here] 
In respect of the allocation of Dáil deputies between the constituencies, in some cases, rep-
resentation would have been virtually unchanged from 1923 to 2011: Carlow-Kilkenny, Laois-
Offaly and Wexford as five-member constituencies, for example, though their representation 
would occasionally have slipped back to four. In areas of traditionally high emigration, there 
would have been a big but gradual drop, though without any need for boundary change: 
Mayo falling from nine to four, for instance, and Cavan-Monaghan from seven to five. In yet 
other cases, notably in constituencies adjoining Dublin, there would have been an increase in 
representation: Kildare from three to seven, Meath from three to six, and Wicklow from three 
to five, for example. 
[table 3 about here] 
The overall effect of this design is summarised in table 3. It results in larger mean constitu-
ency size and greater variation in the deputy-population ratio than that which has been char-
acteristic of the actual position since 1922 (see table 1). It is much simpler and more likely to 
be recognisable to voters than the existing system, in respect of the territorial units on which 
it is based (overwhelmingly, undivided counties), of the ease with which it may be described 
(a few hundred words) and of the stability of constituency boundaries (20 out of the original 
25 would have continued without change since 1922). Further evidence of the robustness of 
this system emerges from the fact that it was devised and published initially long before the 
2011 census took place (Coakley, 2008a); the results of the 2011 census translated seam-
lessly into a new, plausible allocation of seats. 
The Arguments for a Fixed-Boundary System 
Both constitutional provisions and political cultural expectations raise distinctive and chal-
lenging questions about the appropriateness and viability of a scheme of the kind that is out-
lined here. Three specific constitutional issues arise: about equality of representation as pro-
vided for in the constitution’s insistence on a uniform deputy-population ratio, as regards the 
frequency of revision of constituency boundaries, and concerning constituency size. A fourth 
consideration is largely a political cultural one: the extent to which constituencies should seek 
to match, or at least respect, familiar local government boundaries. These four matters may 
be considered in turn. 
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The Principle of Equal Representation 
The intention of the 1937 constitution seems clear in respect of the principle of equality of 
representation. Article 16.2.3° provides that ‘the ratio between the number of members to be 
elected at any time for each constituency and the population of each constituency, as ascer-
tained at the last preceding census, shall, so far as it is practicable, be the same throughout 
the country’ (emphasis added). But the Irish language text is much more demanding; it re-
quires conformity to this ratio ‘sa mhéid gur féidir é’ (‘in as far as possible’), an important 
hardening of emphasis (the implication of ‘practicable’ is that while a particular action might 
be possible, there may be other considerations that militate against its being carried out). 
The Irish version reproduces the requirement of the 1922 constitution, article 26 of which 
stipulated conformity to this ratio ‘so far as possible’ across constituencies. This is just one of 
the several hundred discrepancies between the two versions of the constitution; the definitive 
study of the Irish language text points out that ‘practically every section of the Constitution 
contains divergences between the Irish and the English texts’ (Ó Cearúil, 1999: 7). Since the 
Irish text takes precedence over the English text, the implications of this article are thus more 
demanding than is widely believed to be the case. 
In fact, it could be argued that satisfying this requirement of the constitution would require 
relying on the most basic building block available in the population census. The Irish census 
used the townland as its lowest enumeration and reporting unit from 1841 to 1911 (There 
were 51,158 townlands in 1926, with a mean population of 58). Even after that date popula-
tion figures at townland level continued to be collated, and were made available on request. 
Use of this unit permits the fine-tuning of constituency boundaries in such a way that near-
mathematical accuracy can, if desired, be obtained in the deputy-population ratio from one 
constituency to another. Two questions arise from this: whether such fine-tuning is indeed 
desirable, and whether it is necessary. 
At an early stage of the debate about equal representation, the American Political Science 
Association (1951: 154-5) recommended that approximate equality between congressional 
districts could be obtained by ensuring that deviations should remain within a 10% band on 
either side of the mean within an individual state, and that they should in no case exceed 
15%. As it happened, though, the trend in the USA was in the direction of rigid insistence on 
adherence to a uniform population-representative within states (see Huckabee, 2001). Fol-
lowing the apportionment of seats to the states when the results of the decennial census be-
come available, using purely mathematical considerations, a demanding redistricting process 
is undertaken within each state (a process that, as it happens, has also been tainted by seri-
ous charges of gerrymandering).5 While, following a series of court decisions, something 
The case for fixed-boundary constituencies p. 14 
close to mathematical parity has been achieved within states; there is virtually no variation 
from the overall ratio within each state. In New Zealand, a maximum deviation of 5% from the 
overall population deputy ratio is permitted (McRobie, 2006: 300). Australia uses a complex 
mechanism that requires forward projection of population by a three-and-a-half year period 
after the initial creation of a new set of constituences: by that point, a maximum deviation of 
3.5% is permissible, but the deviation may be up to 10% at the point where the constituen-
cies are actually created (Medew, 2008: 100-102). 
Elsewhere, a wider range of variation in the population-deputy ratio is tolerated. In Germany, 
a maximum target deviation of 15% is specified, and this may in no case exceed 25% 
(Schrott, 2006: 247). Canada allows a relatively generous deviation, 25%, above or below 
the norm for each province (Courtney, 2008: 16). Deviations from the overall population-MP 
ratio in the UK may be quite significant; in the review before the 2005 election, for instance, 
59 constituencies in England (13% of the total) deviated by more than 10% (Johnston et al., 
2003: 339; Rallings et al., 2008: 82-83). Finally, in France there have been huge deviations 
in the population-deputy ratio since 1986, when a maximum deviation of 20% was permitted; 
due to failure to revise the boundaries massive inequalities had developed by 2007, with 
constituencies varying in population from 34,000 to 188,000 (Balinksi, 2008: 182-7)—ranging 
from 67% below to 79% above the national ratio.6 
While the comparative experience suggests, then, that most jurisdictions do not regard the 
unqualified pursuit of uniformity in the population-deputy ratio as desirable, there are circum-
stances that might make it necessary—notably, the position taken by the courts. As already 
mentioned, the judgement in the High Court in the O’Donovan case (1961) placed limits on 
the degree to which boundary revision measures might depart from the national norm, but 
did not insist on mathematical accuracy (nor did it acknowledge the linguistic discrepancy, 
taking the view that ‘no material discordance exists between the English and Irish texts’).7 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled shortly afterwards that ‘exact parity in the ratio be-
tween members and the population of each constituency is unlikely to be obtained and is not 
required’, leaving it open to the Oireachtas to determine what is practicable, and which other 
criteria to take account of.8 The High Court judgement was widely interpreted as permitting a 
‘tolerance’ level of 5% above or below the average deputy-population ratio. More recently, 
though, Mr Justice Clarke questioned this interpretation, suggesting that the implications of 
the 1961 judgement were even narrower: this close reading of the judgement led him to con-
clude that a ‘tolerance’ level of somewhere between 1.0% and 1.7% was intended. He did 
not, however, endorse this as a target to be aimed at, adopting a much broader and more 
permissive interpretation of what would be acceptable.9 
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It is, then, not clear whether the deviations that would arise under the scheme proposed here 
would clash with the constitution, but there is no reason to assume ab initio that they would. 
A narrow, literal interpretation might lead the courts to find wanting all boundary revisions to 
date (including all of those devised by independent boundary commissions). The courts 
have, however, adopted a more holistic approach, seeking to identify the principles lying be-
hind particular constitutional formulations rather than spelling out the literal implications of 
specific clauses. 
The Timing and Mechanics of Revision 
Article 16.2.4o of the constitution requires the Oireachtas to ‘revise the constituencies at least 
once in every twelve years’. It is thus the responsibility of the Oireachtas, and not of any oth-
er body, to carry out the revision. However, the Oireachtas has already created a boundary 
commission to make recommendations on this process, and up to now has enacted these 
recommendations without amendment (with an important qualification in the case of the 1988 
commission, whose terms of reference were allegedly politically biased). The procedure sug-
gested here could also easily be managed by the Oireachtas. The expression ‘revise the 
constituencies’ is clearly intended to refer to maintenance of the deputy-population ratio, and 
this could be done by reapportionment of seats rather than by alteration of boundaries (which 
would need to take place only rarely). This is rather more straightforward than current prac-
tice; it ensures that the constituencies are still being revised, but it greatly simplifies the pro-
cess, and allows it to be completed more quickly. 
Furthermore, the system proposed here would eliminate the need for any significant delay 
between availability of census data and Dáil seat reapportionment. Notwithstanding the dili-
gent work and judicious recommendations of successive boundary commissions, the out-
come of the present arrangement as measured by implementation of policies of electoral 
fairness has been unimpressive. The statistics are startling. 
• Since 1923, the average gap between the date of Irish general elections and the census-
es on which their constituencies were based has been 9.1 years (the record is held by the 
general election of 1933, 22 years after the 1911 census, whose results were used by the 
1923 electoral act), though this has fallen to 5.2 years for the period after 1981, when re-
visions became more frequent. 
• Of nine commissions which have recommended new Dáil constituencies, not one has 
seen its recommendations translated into legally defined constituencies which were used 
in a general election before the next census intervened. 
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Of course, it is likely that the commission which reported in 2012 will see the boundaries it 
devised in use for the general election of 2016, before the results of the 2016 census be-
come available. By way of qualification, it should be pointed out that in two cases (the com-
missions which reported in 1980 and in 1998) the first general election under the new 
boundaries took place before the results of the new censuses were actually published. How-
ever, in four other cases (the commissions reporting in 1983, 1990, 1995 and 2004) the first 
general election under the new boundaries took place after the results of a new census 
showed that these boundaries were already out of date (in three of these cases, these were 
preliminary census reports rather than final results). 
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the current system gives priority to using a formal, ob-
jective historical criterion, rather than to reflecting continuing population change as speedily 
and efficiently as possible. Since constituency commissions have been introduced, it has 
taken, on average, almost three years (specifically, 35 months) from the date of the census 
for a boundary revision act to be passed. This period could be halved if the procedure sug-
gested here were adopted (the final census reports on which the commissions based their 
findings appeared on average 18 months after the census dates). Furthermore, if preliminary 
data were used the period of delay could be shortened to three months from the date of the 
census.10 The case for using such data is strong: the preliminary census report (compiled 
from local enumerators’ summaries immediately after the census) provides an extremely ac-
curate forecast of the figures in the final report (based on the actual census forms), and was 
used as the basis for one electoral act (1947). In 2006, the preliminary data on Dáil constitu-
ency populations deviated only very slightly from the final figures—the deviations ranged be-
tween 0.01% and 0.63%. Because of the pace of recent population movement, it is likely that 
the population data in the preliminary census reports offer a more accurate indicator of popu-
lation on the day of their publication than do the data in the final reports. By waiting for final 
corrected (but essentially historical) data, in other words, the boundary review process works 
with data that are less likely to reflect the contemporary population than the preliminary fig-
ures were. 
The Question of Constituency Size 
The constitution is silent on maximum constituency size, but prescribes three as the mini-
mum representation of any constituency. The approach suggested here implies a mean con-
stituency size considerably larger than has been the norm since 1947. Critics might argue 
that this is incompatible with the single transferable vote system of proportional representa-
tion, which for practical reasons implies modest constituency size. But it should be noted 
that, in the past, voters in Galway were able to cope with a nine-member constituency; large 
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constituencies have been common in Northern Ireland Assembly elections; and in 1925 the 
electorate survived a unique event, the election of 19 senators from a list of 76 candidates by 
means of the single transferable vote (Coakley, 2005). Recent reforms of the local election 
system have seen constituency size there increase from between three and seven council-
lors per area to between six and ten (Kavanagh, 2015: 74). 
There is, however, a quite different way of looking at this objection. It could be argued that 
the practice since 1947 of restricting maximum constituency size to five is incompatible with 
the constitution, which requires not just use of the single transferable vote, but proportional 
representation (i.e. the representation of political forces in the Dáil in approximately the same 
proportion as among those voting).11 Moderately large constituencies are a prerequisite to 
this, since the threshold for representation (which approximates to the Droop quota, as used 
in Dáil elections) will otherwise be too high: 25% in a three-seat constituency, 20% in a four-
seater and 17% in a five-seater, for example. The relationship between proportionality and 
constituency size is well established, with large constituencies important for the representa-
tion not just of smaller parties but also of other groups such as women (Shugart, 1994: 32-
33).12 Although it has been acknowledged that in practice the Irish system performs well in 
delivering relatively proportional results, average constituency size has been described as 
‘strikingly low’ in comparative terms (Gallagher, 2005: 517).13 Significantly, one of the unso-
licited recommendations of the Irish Constitutional Convention of 2012-14 was precisely that 
Dáil constituencies should be enlarged, so that the smallest (and not, as currently, the larg-
est) would return five members. 
The Relationship to Administrative Boundaries 
The extent to which existing administrative boundaries are acknowledged in the constituency 
boundary revision process is a political cultural matter rather than a constitutional-legal one. 
It should be noted that deference to important administrative frontiers is often the primary 
principle in redistricting and seat allocation. Not surprisingly, in such federal systems as the 
USA, Canada, Australia and Germany the states or provinces are sacrosanct: no constituen-
cy may cross their boundaries. Even in unitary states such as England, Wales and Scotland 
the boundaries of major local government units must be respected ‘so far as is practicable’, 
while in France constituency may not cross département boundaries. 
Although the terms of reference of Irish constituency commissions stipulate that ‘the breach-
ing of county boundaries shall be avoided as far as practicable’, this has relatively low priori-
ty, and country boundaries are widely breached. Constituencies are instead made up of 
groupings of obsolete local government units or other unfamiliar territorial areas. This means 
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that they substantially ignore the best-known territorial areas, whose longevity as administra-
tive units seems to have made them a powerful focus of local loyalty. Dating in more-or-less 
their present shape as stable territorial units since the early seventeenth century, the Irish 
counties formed the basis for a range of forms of popular mobilisation from the late eight-
eenth century onwards, and their significance as key cultural units has been reinforced by 
their role in popular Gaelic games, and perhaps also by the weakness of local democracy 
below the level of the county. In any case, it is clear that the Irish electorate sets great store 
by these ancient units, and that they attract considerable popular loyalty. Unpredictable and 
apparently arbitrary changes in constituency boundaries may, it has been argued, have an 
alienating effect on the electorate, which may even become politically demobilised (Ka-
vanagh, 2003: 95-96). This sounds plausible, and similar assessments have been given in 
respect of constituency changes in England; but there appears to be relatively little evidence 
to back this up, and none to indicate that transferred areas are likely to have a lower electoral 
turnout rate than other areas (Pattie et al. 2012). 
Nevertheless, the system proposed here offers a more stable response to people’s sense of 
local identity than the present system, one more respectful of well-known territorial entities. 
This is not to argue that county boundaries should be sacrosanct, or that they should be giv-
en the same weight as major units in federal systems, such as US states. But the unrelenting 
revision of constituencies that has been characteristic of the Irish experience is unnecessary 
unless a very narrow standard of equal representation is specified, and this risks coming into 
conflict with other important principles which a democratic constitution should protect. 
Conclusion 
The Irish approach to the achievement of the principle of equality of representation has been 
firmly based on the British model, where the number of seats in a constituency is fixed (at 
one) and boundaries change relatively frequently to match the changing distribution of the 
population. In administering this approach, the new Irish state began with an essentially polit-
ical process, which in effect gave a key role to the Minister for Local Government, leaving the 
door open to partisan manipulation—a temptation that not all ministers were able to resist 
(Mair, 1986). The High Court judgement in 1961 in the O’Donovan case tied the minister’s 
hands by insisting on a narrow definition of equality, but left the process otherwise open to 
abuse, in that the governing party was free to force through a blueprint in which boundaries 
were micro-managed to the potential benefit of those in power. The introduction of a non-
partisan constituency boundary commission in 1979 effectively depoliticised the process, but 
continued with an approach in which the number of seats per constituency would be fixed 
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within narrow limits (between three and five deputies per constituency) while the fine-tuning 
needed to ensure equality of representation would be secured by boundary adjustment. 
This article has argued that there are serious drawbacks to the current Irish system of elec-
toral redistricting. First, it is time-consuming for those involved (officials and members of the 
boundary commission), who need to consider a wide range of options before deciding on a 
final blueprint. Second, it is an unnecessary distraction for politicians, who can enjoy little 
certainty in respect of the territorial boundaries within which they operate, as their constitu-
encies may acquire or lose additional slices of territory with each revision; and they have no 
way of knowing whether these gains or losses are short- or long-term ones. Third, it is con-
fusing for voters, at best, and deeply alienating, at worst: they may find themselves trans-
ferred, as they see it, out of their own county and into a neighbouring one, potential losing 
the services of a long-term Dáil deputy, in a process that is potentially delegitimizing. 
These costs might be worth bearing for a highly desirable outcome; but this article has 
shown that such an outcome has not been forthcoming in Ireland. Boundary commissions 
have been asked to design constituencies that would match certain rather narrow criteria of 
equal representation had a general election taken place on the same day as the census, but 
which are unlikely to meet them in any election after that. It is worth repeating a point made 
above about an extraordinary feature of this process: to date, the recommendations of every 
single boundary commission have been overtaken by the next census (which showed these 
recommendations to be out of date in varying degrees) before any general election under the 
recommended boundaries had taken place. 
This article has suggested that instead of the British approach, the continental European ap-
proach to the principle of equality of representation is more appropriate to the Irish electoral 
system with its multi-member districts: boundaries are fixed, and the number of members in 
each constituency is adjusted after each population census. This could be done speedily af-
ter the publication of census results (ideally, preliminary rather than final ones) by an official, 
for formal approval by the Oireachtas. The constituencies suggested here could, for instance, 
be used for an allocation based on the results of the 2011 census. This would produce a very 
unfamiliar pattern of constituencies (two three-member, six four-member, nine five-member, 
six six-member, three seven-member, one eight-member and two and nine-member constit-
uencies); but the shape of the constituencies themselves would be very familiar, based on 
well-recognised administrative areas. Their average size would be large, but they would be 
more clearly compatible with the constitution than the present pattern (if we take into account 
arguments in respect of proportionality of representation). Even if this did cause constitution-
al difficulties, these would not be unresolvable. The challenge in moving to any new system 
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is likely, however, to lie in persuading decision makers who have been returned to the Dáil 
under the existing system to take a leap of faith into unfamiliar new territory. 
What are the implications of the Irish experience for broader issues of electoral integrity and 
election administration? The partisan system of constituency boundary revision that survived 
to the 1970s incentivised the micromanagement of boundaries—unintentionally assisted by a 
court ruling in 1961—that left it all too open to accusations of gerrymander. The de facto 
transfer of responsibility to independent commissions brought accusations of political bias 
substantially to an end, but the commissions’ terms of reference were seen as constraining 
them to continue the practice of frequent, large-scale boundary adjustment. There might be a 
case for transferring this responsibility to a standing, multi-purpose electoral commission; but 
this article has argued that there is an even stronger case for simply moving to an automatic 
formula based on familiar administrative boundaries. 
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Table 1: Size and population variation of constituencies under electoral acts, 1923-2013 
 
Act Constituencies by size (number of members)  total mean index of 
  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 total TDs size variation 
1923 6 4 9 . 5 3 1 28 147 5.3 17.4 
1935 15 8 8 . 3 . . 34 138 4.1 20.5 
1947 22 9 9 . . . . 40 147 3.7 27.8 
1961 17 12 9 . . . . 38 144 3.8 8.1 
1969 26 14 2 . . . . 42 144 3.4 9.8 
 
1974 26 10 6 . . . . 42 148 3.5 9.8 
1980 13 13 15 . . . . 41 166 4.0 12.7 
1983 13 13 15 . . . . 41 166 4.0 14.6 
1990 12 15 14 . . . . 41 166 4.0 14.6 
1995 12 15 14 . . . . 41 166 4.0 12.6 
 
1998 16 12 14 . . . . 42 166 4.0 14.1 
2005 18 13 12 . . . . 43 166 3.9 15.4 
2009 17 15 11 . . . . 43 166 3.9 10.8 
2013 13 16 11 . . . . 40 158 4.0 9.9 
Note: The 1959 act (which was declared unconstitutional) has been omitted. Data refer to territorial constituencies 
only, i.e. excluding two university constituencies in 1920 (returning four members each) and 1923 (returning three 
each). The index of variation is the difference between the largest percentage deviation above the mean and the 
largest percentage deviation below the mean. 
 
 
Table 2: Basis of formation of constituencies created by electoral acts, 1923-2013 
Act Boundaries on which based No. of words Creation date of boundaries 
 county sub-county level total to describe new recent old 
  large small micro  boundaries 
1923 20 8 . . 28 386 18 10 . 
1935 7 . 22 5 34 1,837 28 3 3 
1947 16 . 18 6 40 1,725 30 6 4 
1961 4 . 23 11 38 2,168 34 2 2 
1969 2 . 24 16 42 3,816 37 3 2 
 
1974 3 . 36 3 42 2,708 35 4 3 
1980 10 . 21 10 41 2,914 40 . 1 
1983 11 . 21 9 41 2,768 4 36 1 
1990 10 . 20 11 41 2,616 25 1 15 
1995 9 . 21 11 41 3,147 21 8 12 
 
1998 9 . 21 12 42 3,373 22 7 13 
2005 5 . 26 12 43 3,244 28 5 10 
2009 3 . 38 2 43 3,161 24 9 10 
2013 3 . 35 2 40 3,022 29 4 7 
 
Note: The 1959 act (which was declared unconstitutional) has been omitted. ‘Large’ sub-county units refer to local 
electoral areas; ‘small’ units to district electoral divisions, wards, or electoral divisions; ‘micro’ to townlands and 
urban street lines. ‘New’ boundaries are those created for the first time by the act in question; ‘recent’ refers to 
those created in the immediately preceding electoral act; and ‘old’ refers to all others. 
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Table 3: Size, population variation and creation date of notional constituencies, 1923-2013 
Census Constituencies by size (number of members)  total mean index of 
  3 4 5 6 7 8 9 total TDs size variation 
1911 5 2 6 3 5 2 2 25 140 5.6 23.7 
1926 4 6 3 1 6 4 1 25 140 5.6 23.4 
1936 4 7 4 6 4 2 . 27 140 5.2 20.1 
1946 5 5 5 5 6 1 . 27 140 5.2 25.0 
1951 6 4 5 6 3 3 . 27 140 5.2 28.8 
 
1956 6 5 5 5 2 3 1 27 140 5.2 22.0 
1961 6 7 4 6 3 1 1 28 140 5.0 26.8 
1966 5 6 7 6 2 2 . 28 140 5.0 23.8 
1971 4 6 5 5 7 . . 27 140 5.2 29.3 
1979 . 5 7 6 6 3 1 28 166 5.9 22.3 
 
1981 . 5 7 7 4 4 1 28 166 5.9 19.7 
1986 1 5 9 6 4 2 2 29 166 5.7 21.9 
1991 1 5 9 6 4 2 2 29 166 5.7 16.9 
1996 1 5 9 6 4 2 2 29 166 5.7 21.6 
2002 1 5 9 6 4 2 2 29 166 5.7 19.3 
 
2006 1 5 9 6 4 2 2 29 166 5.7 20.1 
2011 2 6 9 6 3 1 2 29 158 5.4 23.9 
Note: The index of variation is the difference between the largest percentage deviation above the mean and the 
largest percentage deviation below the mean. 
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Figure 1. Illustration of possible seat allocation to fixed-boundary constituencies, 
1923 and 2013 
Note. Boundaries are those of counties or groups of counties, except in the case of Dublin and Cork. 
Seat allocation is based on the Sainte-Laguë highest average formula, using census data of 1911 
and 2011 respectively. Assumed number of seats is 140 (1923) and 158 (2013). One new constitu-
ency is shaded. Dublin constituencies, all of which would have changed, over this period, are indi-
cated schematically only. 
1923 2013 
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Notes 
  
1. For further elaboration of points made in this article, see Coakley, 2013: 171-216, on which this 
article draws extensively; this is based also on Coakley, 2007, 2008a, 2008b. 
2. ‘John O’Donovan, Plaintiff, v. The Attorney General, Defendant’, Irish Reports 1961, pp. 114-56. 
3. For discussion of the complexities of sub-county territorial units, see Coakley, 1979. Ireland’s sin-
gle-tier local government system is unique, with the closest parallel to be found in the United 
Kingdom, where Northern Ireland has had a single local government tier since 1973; the Scottish 
and English local government systems allow for a low tier of community and parish councils re-
spectively. The continental European norm is at least a two-tier arrangement, with a small number 
of counties, provinces or equivalent, and a very large number of municipalities or communes. 
4. Computation by Rallings and Thrasher (2007a: 126) of the percentage of constituencies whose 
boundaries were changed shows that the mean over six revisions, 1983-2005, was only 35%; the 
corresponding mean in the Irish case over six revisions, 1983-2007, was 49%, ranging from 10% 
in 1983 to 65% in 2005. 
5. The pursuit of mathematical parity has helped to provide a cover for a revision process that is is 
normally driven by considerations of electoral advantage, and the courts have shown little interest 
in such gerrymandering. The redistricting process in the USA has thus been perceived in a poor 
light, and has attracted such negative descriptions over the decades as ‘disturbing’ ‘notorious and 
shameful’ or ‘invidious’ (Hacker, 1963: 2, 20, 120),  ‘murky’, ‘crass’ or ‘seedy’ (Cain, 1984: xi, 1, 
189), ‘outrageous’, ‘contorted’ or ‘scandalous’ (Monmonier, 2001: 150, 154, 156), ‘one of the most 
conflictive political activities in the United States’ (Engstrom, 2002: 51) and ‘often synonymous 
with gerrymandering’ (Altman et al, 2014: 1). 
6. The electoral systems discussed include the plurality system in the UK and Canada, the alterna-
tive vote system in Australia and the two-ballot system in France, all of which are based on single-
member districts. New Zealand and Germany used mixed systems, but only the single-member 
districts are discussed here. 
7. ‘O’Donovan v. Attorney General’ (1961), pp. 155, 132. 
8. See judgement by Chief Justice Maguire, ‘In re Art. 26 of the Constitution and the Electoral 
(Amendment) Bill, 1961’, Irish Reports 1961, pp. 169-83, at p. 183. This view was echoed by the 
constituency boundary commission in 1980 (Ireland, 1980: 13). In its 1988 report a more specific 
conclusion was reached: ‘the Commission considered that a departure from the mathematical av-
erage of 8% or over would be unacceptable and, in all probability, contrary to the provisions of the 
Constitution relating to equality of representation’ (Ireland, 1988: 28). 
9. This judgement rested on a presumption that the 1961 figure was arrived at by expressing 1,000, 
the average population of a district electoral division, as a percentage of 20,000, the average 
deputy-population ratio at the time. Justice Clarke argued, however, that the figure of 1,000 needs 
to be expressed as a percentage of total population, which ranged at the time from about 100,000 
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in a five-seat to 60,000 in a three-seat constituency, giving a ‘tolerance’ level of somewhere be-
tween 1.0% and 1.7%. See ‘Murphy and another v. Minister for Environment and others’, [2007] 
IEHC 185, ss. 3.12-13; Irish Reports 2008. 
10. The High Court ruled in 2007 that the commission is required to use final rather than preliminary 
census data. See ‘Murphy v. Minister for Environment’ (2007); ss. 6.13, 8.3, where Mr Justice 
Clarke asked ‘whether measures can be put in place to minimise the gap between the availability 
of census figures and the enactment of legislation’. 
11. The 2007 High Court judgement fired a warning shot regarding the overriding need to defend pro-
portionality; see ‘Murphy v. Minister for Environment’ (2007), s. 7.3. 
12. This point is also made in respect of Irish elections by Engstrom (1987), but is disputed in the 
case of the 2002 election by White (2006). 
13. The Irish system seems to have achieved a relatively high degree of proportionality initially (Laver 
and Mair, 1975; Gallagher, 1975; O’Leary, 1979: 107-10), with constituency size apparently hav-
ing relatively little impact (see also Gallagher, 1986: 258-60). But, whatever the actual outcome 
the intention to gerrymander has also been alleged (Carstairs, 1980: 217). 
